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A B S T R A C T. This Feature explores what it would mean to disestablish the family. It examines
a particular theory of religious disestablishment, one that emphasizes institutional pluralism and
the importance of competing sources of authority, and argues that this model of church-state
relationships has much to teach us about family-state relationships. Though substantial rights to
what might be called "free exercise of the family" have been recognized in American
constitutional doctrine, at present there is no parallel principle of familial disestablishment. The
state is free to regulate families qua families, and to encourage or discourage certain kinds of
familial relationships. This Feature suggests reasons to rethink these existing familial
establishments. Disestablishment is a risky and unpredictable enterprise, but its risks may be the
risks inherent in liberty.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of a family, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof....
Nothing seems more churlish-or more likely to provoke reactionary
critique -than an attack on the family. Plato's Republic famously proposed a
system in which women and children would belong to all men in common,'
and for that (and other reasons) the Republic is sometimes derided as an
argument for a totalitarian regime Similarly, proposals to "abolish the family"
in communist literature3 have been the target of intense criticism by thinkers in
the classical liberal tradition.4 According to these critiques, totalitarian or
communist regimes are bad because they dissolve families, which are
self-evidently worthwhile. But one could also argue from the other direction:
families are worthwhile in part because they make totalitarianism less likely.
Families are institutions in which individuals find meaningful relationships,
necessary nurturing and support, and a structure of authority independent of
the state. Individuals with strong family ties are more likely to be capable of
critical reflection about organized political institutions; individuals who are
family members before they are citizens are less susceptible to organized public
indoctrination.'
1. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 4 5 7 d (R.E. Allen trans., Yale Univ. Press 2006).
2. For a detailed critique of Plato's Republic as totalitarian, see KARL R. POPPER, 1 THE OPEN
SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES: THE SPELL OF PLATO (5th ed. 1966). As Popper explains Plato's
argument, "family loyalties might... become a possible source of disunion." Id. at 48. To
ensure political stability and social harmony, "[n] o member of the ruling class must be able
to identify his children, or his parents." Id.
3. KARL MARx & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 21-22 (David McLellan ed.,
Oxford University Press 1992) (1848) (responding to arguments against the "infamous"
communist proposal of abolishing the family).
4. See, e.g., IRVING KRISTOL, NEOCONSERVATISM: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN IDEA 143-44
(1995) (describing and critiquing "hostility" toward the family in communist and socialist
thought).
s. The Greek drama Antigone is perhaps the most famous literary illustration of the competing
claims of family and state. Antigone's brother Polyneices has been killed in the course of a
revolt against Creon, King of Thebes, and Creon prohibits the burial of Polyneices as
punishment for his disloyalty. Antigone buries Polyneices anyway: "Is he not my
brother... ? I shall never desert him, never .... [Creon] has no right to keep me from my
own." SOPHOCLES, THE THEBAN PLAYS 128 (E.F. Wading trans., Penguin Books 1974). Of
course, Antigone believes her brother's burial is both a familial obligation and a religious
one; for this reason, her story illustrates that religion as well as family might generate duties
or values that clash with political obligations. For further discussion, see infra text
accompanying notes 28-29.
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Similar antitotalitarian arguments have been advanced in defense of the
religion clauses in the United States Constitution.6 We should resist the
establishment of a single official church and instead embrace religious
pluralism, the argument goes, because a populace with a diverse array of
religious beliefs is less likely to enable or accept excessive concentrations of
government power. Notably, this line of thought does not condition the
constitutional protection of religion on the degree to which religion serves
"state interests," as that phrase is typically used.7 To the contrary, religion is
recognized as an important dimension of human life that may well conflict
with political obligations or the claims of public institutions. Indeed, to foster
some tension between institutions is precisely the point: we seek to preserve
separate sources of authority so no single authority gains too much power.
Toward that end, the Constitution validates individual liberty interests directly
by protecting the free exercise of religion. At the same time, it provides
indirect, structural protection for individual religious liberty by insisting on the
institutional separation of church and state. 8 The Establishment Clause may
sometimes be thought to protect the state from the influence of religion, but it
is equally or more concerned with protecting religion from the influence of the
state. Indeed, one of the goals of the Establishment Clause is to preserve
distinctive spheres of meaning, value, and authority for these two institutions.
By this account, to disestablish religion is hardly to abolish it: disestablishment
seeks to preserve the possibility of religious freedom along with other
liberties.9
6. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Toleration in Edmund Burke's
"Constitution of Freedom," 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 393, 425-26 [hereinafter McConnell,
Establishment and Toleration]; Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HAv. L. REV. 1409, 1514-17 (1990) [hereinafter
McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding]; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The
Limits of Equal Liberty as a Theoty of Religious Freedom, 85 TEx. L. REV. 1247, 1271 (2007)
(book review).
7. The antitotalitarian argument against an established church can be thought to serve state
interests if we think a democratic government of limited powers has an interest in remaining
a government of limited powers. But we do not usually associate the phrase "state interests"
with an interest in limitations on state power.
8. See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 9, 37 (2004) ("A longstanding claim about the relationship between the Free Exercise
Clause and the Establishment Clause is that the Free Exercise Clause protects liberty directly
and the Establishment Clause protects liberty indirectly.").
9. This last point is crucial. On the antitotalitarian argument, the Establishment Clause is not
simply an enforcement mechanism for the Free Exercise Clause. Separate spheres of
authority are important not only because separation protects religious liberty, but also
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This antitotalitarian view of church-state relations has much to teach us
about family-state relations. This Feature explores what it would mean to
disestablish the family-how a principle of familial nonestablishment could
ensure familial and individual freedom."° In many ways, the rationales for the
Free Exercise and (non-) Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment
support parallel principles of free exercise and nonestablishment for the family.
Indeed, substantial rights to what we call "free exercise of the family" -rights
to marry and to divorce," to procreate or avoid procreation,12 to direct the
education of one's children, 3 and to cohabit with relatives' 4- have already been
recognized in American constitutional doctrine."5 But there is not, at present,
any parallel principle of nonestablishment. Legislators and other policymakers
are free to regulate families qua families, and to encourage or discourage certain
kinds of familial relationships. Legal privileges or burdens are often contingent
on an individual's family status. One of the most obvious ways in which
states - and the federal government - have established a particular vision of the
family is by limiting civil marriage to heterosexual couples.' 6 But there are
other forms of familial establishment. Just as religious establishment often
assumed the form of criminal prosecutions for nonconformance, familial
because competition among authoritative institutions helps maintain limitations on
government power in areas other than religion.
1o. The terms "nonestablishment" and "disestablishment" are used interchangeably in
discussions of the Establishment Clause. We use the verb "disestablish" to refer to efforts to
untangle existing establishments, and either "disestablishment" or "nonestablishment" to
refer to an ongoing norm against establishment. On what constitutes an "establishment," of
religion or of a family, see infra text accompanying notes 26-27.
11. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
12. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
13. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 4o6 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
14. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
15. We discuss the "free exercise of the family" in more detail in Part II.
16. To date, only a handful of U.S. jurisdictions permit same-sex marriage. See Melissa Murray,
Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94
IoWA L. REv. 1253, 1265 n.45 (2009) (discussing the emergence of same-sex marriage in a
minority of states). Most states do not permit same-sex marriages. Indeed, many U.S.
jurisdictions maintain mini-Defense of Marriage Acts that explicitly restrict civil marriage to
opposite-sex couples. See Andrew Koppelman, The Difference the Mini-DOMAs Make, 38
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 265, 265-66 (2007) (describing the enactment of mini-DOMAs in a
number of U.S. jurisdictions). Similarly, the federal Defense of Marriage Act defines
marriage as a heterosexual union for purposes of federal law. See i U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28
U.S.C. § 1738(c).
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establishment sometimes has occurred through the force of the criminal law.17
In this Feature, we give particular attention to instances in which criminal laws
are used to enforce a particular model of the family. Ultimately, our focus is the
use of state power to encourage or discourage particular visions of the family,
and criminal sanctions are often, but not always, the most intrusive form of
such power.
We begin in Part I by elaborating the antitotalitarian argument for a
principle of disestablishment of religion. In Part II, we consider the extent to
which a particular model of the family has been established in American law.
We examine a number of constitutional challenges to state regulations of
families to ascertain the outer limits of the power of the state over the family.
As an established church seeks to ensure political stability and production of
the right kind of citizen through a coincidence of civic and ecclesiastical
authority, so American law has sought to guarantee political stability and a
model citizenry through regulation of the family. We emphasize, however, that
establishment is not an all-or-nothing matter. In several ways, the recognition
of rights of free exercise of the family has already led toward disestablishment.
Other incidents of familial establishment remain in force, however, and in Part
III, we offer some initial reflections on the possibilities, promises, and perils of
further familial disestablishment. We do so by means of comparison: we
contrast the antitotalitarianism of familial disestablishment with the strongly
statist proposals of recent scholarship by Dan Markel, Jennifer Collins, and
Ethan Leib. 
8
I. AN ANTITOTALITARIAN VIEW OF (RELIGIOUS)
DISESTABLISHMENT
A constitutional provision with disputed interpretations and muddled
doctrine is no rarity. But even as constitutional disputes go, those concerning
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment are especially pronounced,
and doctrinal clarity is elusive. In this Feature, we will neither survey the
disputes nor attempt to resolve them. Instead, we examine a particular
understanding of the purpose of disestablishment of religion and consider its
implications for family-state relationships. This theory of religious
disestablishment has occasionally surfaced in judicial opinions and scholarly
I7. Murray, supra note 16, at 1264-70 (discussing criminal law's role in articulating and
enforcing the normative parameters of intimate life).
is. DAN MARKEL, JENNIFER M. COLLINS & ETHAN J. LEIB, PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIEs (2009).
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writing, and we will note some of those appearances below. But we do not seek
to unify doctrine, to identify the one true meaning of constitutional text, or to
show the historical pedigree of this view of disestablishment.' 9 Ours is an
argument of principle and political theory, and caveats duly issued, we proceed
to it.
The particular defense of disestablishment of interest here is deeply
grounded in principles of limited government.2" It stems from the idea that in a
liberal democracy, not only power but also limitations on power require
popular support. It seems obvious enough that a democratic government
cannot survive unless it is accepted by a substantial portion of the populace.
Too rarely noticed, however, is the fact that restrictions on government power
also depend on public opinion. Without popular support for principles of
limited government, the ruling majority may be tempted to override
inconvenient limitations. Even the existence of a written constitution is not
alone sufficient to forestall what Alexis de Tocqueville called "the tyranny of
the majority."2' Constitutions require interpretation and enforcement, and
majority sentiment shapes both interpretation and enforcement to a
considerable degree.'
In order to preserve the limits in a system of limited government, citizens
must be able to view political authority with skepticism and to reflect critically
on the ruling authorities. But as a matter of human psychology, skepticism and
ig. Commentators disagree on whether a single principle can explain the Establishment Clause;
most say no. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (expressing doubt that there could be
one "Grand Unified Theory" of the Establishment Clause). Noah Feldman argues that as a
matter of intellectual history, a single theory-Lockean liberty of conscience -unified the
various arguments made in favor of disestablishment in colonial and post-revolutionary
America. See Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 346, 372-98 (2002) (identifying, and arguing against, scholarship that identifies
multiple theories of establishment).
2o. Limited government is a fairly capacious concept, since there is a considerable distance
between no state and a total state. See Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited
Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 285-86 (2005). For purposes of this Feature, we need not
specify the precise structure or scope of government power; we imagine disestablishment as
a principle for a world in which there is some ruling authority but not an absolute ruler.
21. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 250 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
trans., Harper Perennial 1988) (1835) (discussing the "tyranny of the majority").
22. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMsELvEs: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVrEW (2004); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Rules of Recognition,
Constitutional Controversies, and the Dizzying Dependence of Law on Acceptance, in THE RULE OF
RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 175 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar
Himma eds., 2009).
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critical reflection are neither innate nor inevitable. Humans learn to think in
the context of institutions, and a person exposed to only one institution will
have a difficult time imagining any other.23 So a democratic, limited
government requires a plurality of authoritative institutions. According to
Tocqueville, the success of American democracy was linked to the proliferation
of subnational associations and institutions: churches, political parties,
business organizations, and myriad civic associations. 4 Individuals with
affiliations to multiple associations will be exposed to competing ideologies
and competing accounts of justice and value.2" Such persons will be more likely
to reflect on the various institutional claims and to criticize or even reject
certain claims of authority. To be sure, institutional pluralism provides no hard
guarantee of such critical distance; the institutions that grow independently of
the state may yet end up endorsing and reinforcing the state's own authority.
(In practice, some religious traditions in the United States do just this.) So
institutional pluralism provides no guarantees of skeptical, critical citizens, but
it provides better odds than institutional consolidation. In short, persons for
whom government is not the only imaginable source of authority are more
likely to endorse the idea of limited government, and they are more likely to
engage in the practices of critique that make limited government a reality.
Religious establishment, on this account, consists of a coincidence of
political and ecclesiastical authority that crowds out or suppresses competing
frameworks or ideologies. Disestablishment resists that coincidence of
authority, recognizing religion as a potentially powerful source of extrapolitical
23. Cf. MARY DOUGLAS, How INSTITUTIONS THINK 92 (1986) (arguing that given the extent to
which institutions shape individual thought, "the hope of intellectual independence is to
resist, and the necessary first step in resistance is to discover how the institutional grip is
laid upon our mind").
24. See, e.g., TOCQUEVLLLE, supra note 21, at 68-70 (discussing the independence of New
England townships); id. at 174-79 (discussing political parties); id. at 189-95 (discussing
political associations as guarantees against tyranny); id. at 513-17 (noting the democratic
benefits of civil associations not formed for explicitly political purposes).
25. Such individuals will also be exposed to competing understandings of law. Robert Cover
famously argued that individuals inhabit different "normative worlds," and those worlds
produce different and often irreconcilable claims about the content and meaning of the law.
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HAI- .
L. REv. 4, 11-19 (1983). Cover called the production of these competing claims jurisgenesis,
and courts' decisions to recognize one claim at the expense of another jurispathic. The
antitotalitarian argument could be understood as an attempt to embrace, rather than
forestall, the "multiplicity of meaning" that jurisgeneration produces. See id. at 16. Stephen
Carter develops a similar argument with specific reference to religious communities and
their antitotalitarian potential. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A
MEDITATION ON LAW, RELIGION, AND LOYALTY 27-35, 47-48, 53-54 (1998).
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authority. Once again, we emphasize that religious authority is not inevitably
extrapolitical. In many states past and present, religious authority and political
authority coincide. The difference between establishment and disestablishment
turns on whether these sources of authority are intertwined or distinct-
whether it is possible to disentangle what is God's and what is Caesar's.26 If
there are obligations, values, or principles that are God's and not Caesar's, then
there are limits to Caesar's power.
2 7
Or Creon's. Sophocles's Antigone illustrates the clash of political obligations
with those that are both religious and familial. Importantly, the play illustrates
that religious institutions are not necessarily more likely to cultivate dissent, or
more respectful of individual autonomy, than the state; as we just noted,
institutional pluralism provides no guarantees. But amid competing
authoritative claims, the ability to conceptualize limited government, and
perhaps the capacity for individual autonomy, has a better chance to develop.
When Antigone learns of Creon's order that her brother Polyneices, traitor to
the kingdom of Thebes, must not be buried, she first speaks in the language of
duty. She insists she will bury Polyneices in spite of the order, because "the
holiest laws of heaven" require it: "I know my duty, where true duty lies. " '8
After the burial, however, when Antigone has been captured and is facing
punishment, she speaks not of duty but of choice. She recognizes disagreement
about whether Creon's law or the law of the heavens is supreme, and she takes
pride in her disobedience as an act of agency. 9
The principle of disestablishment under consideration here is not only a
substantive limitation on government power -government may not establish a
church-but also an attempt to ensure that this and other substantive
limitations on state power will survive over the long term. In other words, the
26. See Matthew 22:21.
27. William Gaston makes similar arguments, also with reference to God, Caesar, and
Antigone. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM 93-103 (2002); William A. Galston,
The Idea of Political Pluralism, in NoMOs XILIX: MORAL UNIVERSALISM AND PLURALISM 95
(Henry S. Richardson & Melissa S. Williams eds., 2009) [hereinafter Galston, The Idea of
Political Pluralism]. Galston decries "civic totalism," which seems to be the idea that "a
demos that observes the norms of democratic decision-making may do what it wants,"
including regulating nonstate institutions to serve public ends. Galston, The Idea of Political
Pluralism, supra, at 103-04. The worry about civic totalism is akin to a worry about
totalitarianism.
28. SOPHOCLES, supra note 5, at 128-29.
29. Antigone's sister, Ismene, had declined to help Antigone with the burial ("I cannot act
Against the State. I am not strong enough."). Id. at 128. After the crime, Ismene wishes to
share Antigone's punishment, but Antigone coldly refuses: "You chose; life was your choice,
when mine was death.... Your way seemed right to some, to others mine." Id. at 141.
1244
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antitotalitarian principle3" is consistent with a robust right of free exercise, but
it is not only an enforcement mechanism to protect free exercise. Its aims are
broader: it seeks to encourage the capacity to question the scope of state power.
Contours of the argument, from a believer's perspective, can be found in
James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance. "It is the duty of every man to
render to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be
acceptable to him. This dity is precedent, both in order of time and in degree
of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society."3' In other words, religious
duties-which each man must determine for himself-set necessary limits to
the state's power. Madison went on to argue that in historical fact, ecclesiastical
establishments led to consolidations of power that "in no instance have ...
been... the guardians of the liberties of the people." 32 Consequently, even for
those who belong to the church that the state would establish, "it is proper to
take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. 33 As appropriate for his
time, Madison spoke of "tyranny" rather than totalitarianism. But his concern
was that the union of civil and ecclesiastical authority would eventually lead to
a government of absolute power.
3o. This terminology is somewhat anachronistic, because, as our discussion of Madison's 1785
text makes clear, this argument for institutional separation precedes the term
"totalitarianism." Mussolini introduced the latter term in the 1920s, and the word quickly
became associated with a form of government that seeks total control over its subjects,
including control of speech, belief, and opinion. See BENITO MUSSOLINI, FASCISM: DOCTRINE
AND INSTITUTIONS 11 (1935) ("The Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing; outside
of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value. Thus understood, Fascism
is totalitarian, and the Fascist State-a synthesis and a unit inclusive of all values-
interprets, develops, and potentiates the whole life of a people."). Carl Schmitt developed
similar arguments in support of the Third Reich. See Carl Schmitt, The Way to the Total
State, in FOUR ARTICLES 1931-1938 (Simona Draghici trans. & ed., 1999). The critical
analysis that introduced the term more widely is HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF
TOTALITARIANISM (1951). Today, the adjective "antitotalitarian" invokes efforts to forestall
expansive government control of private conduct and even thought and belief. See, e.g., Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784-87 (1989) (describing privacy
rights as antitotalitarian). Accordingly, we use the word to describe our account of
nonestablishment, notwithstanding the fact that the adjective is of more recent vintage than
the underlying argument.
31. JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 8 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 295, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973) (1785).
32. Id. at 302.
33. Id. at 300. The strong antitotalitarian argument, which is not necessarily one spelled out by
Madison in Memorial and Remonstrance, is that persons exposed to plural authoritative
institutions are more likely to take alarm at the first experiment on their liberties.
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But Madison is hardly the only inspiration for the antitotalitarian
argument. 4 In fact, in modern constitutional scholarship, one may find
antitotalitarian arguments for religious disestablishment in the work of
Michael McConnell, who has suggested that Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance may have loomed too large in First Amendment jurisprudence. 31
In his extensive scholarship on religion and the Constitution, McConnell has
sought to combine Madisonian insights with lessons from Edmund Burke,
who saw religious toleration and an established church as compatible?
6
McConnell directs his criticism toward what he characterizes as "the true
opposite" of both Madison and Burke: "the totalitarian system first introduced
in France, where the state .. .is the highest authority and both established
church and individual conscience are subjugated to it."37 McConnell's reference
to totalitarianism does not correspond exactly to the argument we have
sketched above, for he argues that "the recognition of an authority higher than
the state" is "central to the constraint of governmental power. '38 This
formulation may imply that religious belief is itself a sine qua non of limited
government, and we are not sure whether that is true as an empirical matter.
But we are interested in the argument that alternative, extrapolitical sources of
authority of some form are key to the survival of limited government, and it is
certainly true that religion has often provided those external sources of
authority.3 9
Glimmers of antitotalitarian principles have sometimes appeared in U.S.
constitutional decisions, especially those that focus on the prospect of religious
coercion in education.4" If the totalitarian danger is a fear that the state will be
able to manipulate and direct thought, then we should expect particular
34. Nor, as we discuss below, is the argument one that would persuade only the religious.
35. See Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2105, 2107 (2003) (arguing that the Court
has focused too much on "one event in one State" to interpret the Establishment Clause, and
referring to the dispute in Virginia that prompted Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance).
36. McConnell, Establishment and Toleration, supra note 6, at 393-96.
37. Id. at 426.
38. Id.; see also Michael W. McConnell, Origins and Historical Understanding, supra note 6, at
1516 (1990) ("If government admits that God (whomever that may be) is sovereign, then it
also admits that its claims on the loyalty and obedience of the citizens is partial and
instrumental. Even the mighty democratic will of the people is, in principle, subordinate to
the commands of God, as heard and understood in the individual conscience. In such a
nation, with such a commitment, totalitarian tyranny is a philosophical impossibility.").
39. See also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 1271 (explaining that "religious freedom finds its
basic justification in liberalism's opposition to totalitarian pretensions of civil government").
40. See infra Part Ill.
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vigilance in venues where impressionable minds are instructed. And in fact, the
Supreme Court has expressed concern for "laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy
over the classroom." 4 Justice Jackson's opinion in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette probably constitutes the Court's most explicit
development of this principle.42 Striking down a mandatory flag salute in
public schools in the midst of World War II, Justice Jackson contrasted the
First Amendment's promise of limited government and ideological diversity
with "the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies."43 To be sure,
Barnette was based on broad First Amendment principles rather than the
specific religion clauses." But similar values could explain the Establishment
Clause. Relying on that provision explicitly, the Court repeatedly has struck
down laws providing for prayer in public school classrooms or at certain
official school events.45 In one such case, Lee v. Weisman, the Court directly
acknowledged the political importance of extrapolitical values: "an ethic and a
morality which transcend human invention" might advance "the sense of
41. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 1O5 (1968) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967)) (finding state prohibition of teaching evolution to be motivated by
religious belief and to violate the First Amendment).
42. 319 U.S. 624 (1943); cf Galston, The Idea of Political Pluralism, supra note 27, at 113-16
(discussing Barnette as alternative to civic totalism).
43. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641. The antitotalitarian principle prohibits government from taking
certain steps to shore up its own authority. Justice Jackson was optimistic that this
prohibition bore little danger for the United States, but one can also understand the
antitotalitarian argument as a claim that democracy entails certain risks.
We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we
owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal
attitudes. When they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deal
with here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things
that do not matter much.
Id. at 641-42; see also infra text accompanying note 189 (discussing the implications of Justice
Jackson's Barnette opinion). Robert Tsai has argued that "the anti-totalitarian enterprise...
utterly dominated free speech mythos" after World War II, but he notes that this enterprise
often led the Supreme Court to uphold restrictions on allegedly dangerous or inflammatory
speech. Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181, 205
(2004).
44. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634-35 ("Nor does the issue as we see it turn on one's possession of
particular religious views .... While religion supplies appellees' motive for ... making the
issue in this case, many citizens who do not share these religious views hold such a
compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual.").
45. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
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community and purpose sought by all decent societies. ''46 But, the Court said,
"though the First Amendment does not allow the government to stifle prayers
which aspire to these ends, neither does it permit the government to undertake
that task for itself."47
This language is worth close consideration, for it may help distinguish the
antitotalitarian argument from other claims of the political value of religion.
Defenders of establishment and disestablishment alike have argued that
religion (Christianity in particular) helps instill certain qualities needed for
republican self-government, such as discipline, temperance, and respect for
others.41 In claiming that religion might foster a sense of community and
purpose, the Lee Court seemed to make a similar suggestion. The
antitotalitarian argument of interest here focuses on a somewhat different
ability, no less critical to self-government. As discussed above, this is the ability
to view one's own rulers skeptically and critically. It is the capacity to stand at a
distance from the state, to judge it, and to demand limitations on its power.
Obviously, this capacity may not foster political stability and indeed may
endanger it. But as Justice Jackson suggested in Barnette, the risks posed by
dissenters are probably quite low, and in any event, constitutional democracy
involves some inherent risks. 49 To have a limited government means that the
government will not be permitted to do anything and everything it can to
forestall political unrest or instability. Unlike the broad claim that religious
citizens will be virtuous and loyal (a claim that does not necessarily imply
disestablishment), the antitotalitarian argument contemplates the possibility
that a religious citizen will be contrarian - or even illiberal.
The preceding paragraphs consider a political and nonsectarian argument
for religious disestablishment. In the many disputes over the meaning of the
Establishment Clause, complaints are often raised that various interpretations
of the clause are themselves predicated upon religious faith, or else hostile to
such faith. It is worth noting, then, that the antitotalitarian argument sketched
here presumes neither belief nor nonbelief. It emphasizes the value of religion
as an extrapolitical source of authority. A person of faith might appreciate this
argument for disestablishment, just as a nonbeliever might appreciate the value
46. Lee, 505 U.S. at 589.
47. Id.
48. McConnell, supra note 35, at 2193-96.
49. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641-42.
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of distinct authoritative institutions."0 By many historical accounts, America
came to disestablishment somewhat circuitously; church and state were
separated less as a matter of principle and more as an insurance policy for risk-
averse believers. Clashes between Christian sects, and especially between
Protestants and a rapidly growing Catholic community, led many believers to
prefer disestablishment over the risk that their religious adversaries would gain
majority control and establish an unwelcome church.5 ' This explanation of
religious disestablishment in America only illustrates the antitotalitarian
argument: individuals exposed to plural claims of authority and value are more
likely to appreciate, and demand, limits on government power.5 2
The antitotalitarian principle under consideration here is not necessarily
specific to religious institutions, and in the remainder of this Feature we will
explore its application to the family. Before doing so, it is worth reiterating that
we do not claim that antitotalitarianism is the only or even the predominant
paradigm through which to understand religious disestablishment. Many
scholars find a principle of equality, and a corresponding requirement of state
neutrality toward religion, to be the central value of the religion clauses. Not
surprisingly, then, other works that apply the language of disestablishment to
nonreligious contexts are often calls for a principle of state neutrality. 3 While
principles of equality and neutrality capture important dimensions of
nonestablishment, they do not necessarily focus our attention on institutions,
so. Cf. McConnell, supra note 35, at 2205 (noting the "remarkable" fact that "the most
prominent voices for disestablishment" in early American history often relied on explicitly
religious arguments).
s. See Michael W. McConnell, Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic Values Are Ill-Served
by Democratic Control of Schooling, in NOMOS XLIII: MORAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION 87,
103-04 (Stephen Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002).
52. In other words, it may be the case that the antitotalitarian rationale for disestablishment was
one that early Americans performed unselfconsciously rather than theorized in extensive
detail.
53. See David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2002); Andrew
Koppelman, Sexual and Religious Pluralism, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION & HUMAN RIGHTS IN
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE 215 (Saul M. Olyan & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1998);
Michael W. McConnell, What Would It Mean to Have a "First Amendment" for Sexual
Orientation?, in SExuAL ORIENTATION & HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE
234 (Saul M. Olyan & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1998); Andrew P. Morriss & Benjamin D.
Cramer, Disestablishing Environmentalism, 39 ENVTL. L. 309 (2009). Consistent with our
reading of Michael McConnell as an advocate of a version of antitotalitarianism, his
argument for "education disestablishment" is more concerned with protecting the
possibility of separate, competing authoritative institutions. See McConnell, supra note 51.
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or on the particular value of institutional pluralism. 4 Indeed, a norm of
neutrality can be interpreted as indifference; some read the neutrality
jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause as official indifference to whether
churches thrive or falter. An understanding of nonestablishment that
emphasizes institutional pluralism is hardly indifferent: this approach sees the
existence of multiple, competing institutions as an affirmative good.
Of course, to borrow from the philosophy and jurisprudence of the First
Amendment may reproduce some of the unresolved questions of that field. But
that is part of the attraction: to a substantial degree, the perennial puzzles of
church-state relationships have corollaries in family-state relationships. Just as
scholars ask, for example, what constitutes religion and whether the
Constitution can regulate religion without adopting an already normatively
loaded conception of it, so too one might ask what constitutes a family and
whether there is any nonideological way to define it."5 Additionally,
commentators ask why churches and religion should be afforded distinctive
constitutional status, and the same question should be raised with respect to
families. 6 Are churches, or families, different from other associations and
relationships, and if so, how? For us, these difficult questions are part of the
appeal of the disestablishment model.
54. A growing literature advocates increased attention to institutional context in First
Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REv. 84 (1998); Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First
Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1256 (2005). In the subset of this literature that directly
addresses religious institutions, one finds frequent emphasis of the political value of plural,
autonomous institutions. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an
Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REv. 273, 292-93 (2008); Paul
Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HtAv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009) (arguing that First Amendment doctrine should be based on an
understanding of church and state as distinct institutions, each sovereign in its own sphere).
55. Kent Greenawalt has proposed that constitutional analysis should interpret the term
"religion" by deploying Ludwig Wittgenstein's multifactor "family resemblances" approach.
See, e.g., 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND
FAIRNESS 139 (2006). This approach creates an opportunity for normative bias. The
definition of religion (or for our purposes, of the family) will depend on the "selection of the
'paradigm cases.'" Eduardo Pefialver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 815
(1997). Like religion, which is not easily defined but is recognizable by "family
resemblances," the family itself is identified in law by its resemblance to a certain model of
kinship and domesticity, as we discuss below.
S6. If we identify principled (rather than textual) reasons for religion to get special
constitutional protection, those principles may well apply to families as well. Families play
similarly important roles in individual development; they impose similarly not-quite-
voluntarist obligations; and they have similar cultural and moral importance in the lives of
citizens.
119:123 6 2010
DISESTABLISHING THE FAMILY
II. FAMILIAL ESTABLISHMENT: ENCOUNTERS WITH THE
CONSTITUTION
Families are often sites of value creation and moral development, as
philosophers and political leaders alike have long recognized. 7 It is often
simply taken for granted that a state will encourage, or even require, the kind
of familial institutions most likely to produce the right kind of citizens. The
right kind of citizen, and thus the best form of family, may vary from one
regime to another, but the power of the regime to regulate the family for these
purposes is rarely questioned.
Of course, churches too are sites of value creation and moral development,
and at one time it was taken for granted that a state would encourage or require
the kind of religious institutions most likely to produce the right kind of
citizens. The puzzle, then, is why the liberal commitment to religious
disestablishment has never led to any similar call for familial disestablishment.
One possible explanation is that the family is not seen as posing the same
threats as an established religion. That is, the state's promotion of a particular
form of family-the marital, nuclear family-does not entail the same thick
ideological content as an ecclesiastical establishment because the values
associated with the marital family are perceived as broad and inclusive values
whose active promotion by the state poses no threat to ideological diversity or
healthy political debate."5
But is this right? In this Part, we suggest that the particular normative
framework promoted by the model legal family is more ideologically specific
than a set of general principles easily acceptable to all members of a democratic
society. We begin with the constitutional construction of the marital, nuclear
family as an ideal family, and explore the underlying ideological implications of
that model. We then examine constitutional challenges to criminal laws that
S7. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 17-23 (1989) (discussing
perceptions of "the family as a school of justice" in western political thought); JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 462-71 (1972).
58. For example, Linda McClain argues that the state may promote (marital) families as
"seedbeds of civic virtue," but argues for a broad, liberal list of virtues that includes
toleration, gender equality, and the capacity for critical reflection. LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE
PLACE OF FAMILiES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 50-84 (20o6).
Similarly, Mary Anne Case has suggested that modern marriage law promotes at most a
very general vision of the good-"the assumption that the social good is likely to be
promoted when government facilitates people working together to achieve joint ends."
Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1782 (2005). According to Case,
"it is hardly a thick and rich ethical vision that is presently being given state sponsorship."
Id.
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regulate the family. We identify a thick, aggressive version of familial
establishment in a criminal ban on polygamy, and a somewhat thinner form of
familial establishment in the Supreme Court's decisions concerning parental
control over their children's education.
A. The Marriage Model
Notwithstanding the considerable extent to which familial relationships are
regulated by state law, a national, federalized understanding of the family helps
determine the parameters of government power over families.5 9
Unsurprisingly, this understanding is closely intertwined with marriage. As a
general matter, marriage historically has been a conduit to family formation, as
law channeled individuals (and their sexual behavior) into marriage, and from
marriage into coupled parenthood.6"
Constitutional doctrine's clear preference for the marital nuclear family
above other alternatives is evident in a number of contexts.6 ' Take, for
example, the Supreme Court's decisions concerning unmarried fathers. On its
face, Stanley v. Illinois appeared to diminish the importance of the marital
model. 62 There the Court struck down a state law requiring the children of
unwed fathers to become wards of the state upon the death of the mother. Yet,
even as the Court emphasized constitutional protections for biological fathers,
59. In the following discussion, we rely almost exclusively on decisions of the United States
Supreme Court in order to consider the outer parameters of the state's power to define the
family or to limit government intervention into families. Our reliance on Supreme Court
cases resists the claim that family law is exclusively the creature of state law, and emphasizes
the degree to which a normative model of the family has been adopted at the national level.
For historical evidence that family law has long been a subject of federal and state concern,
see Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998).
6o. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 497-
98 (1992). This channeling function occurred in a number of ways. Family law historically
prescribed the parameters for executing a valid marriage, specifying relationships that were
eligible for marriage and those that were not. See Murray, supra note 16, at 1266. However,
family law relied on criminal law to bolster and police the normative parameters of
marriage. Id. at 1266-67. Historically, family law's prescriptions for valid marriages have
been echoed by criminal law's prohibitions on behavior deemed ineligible for, or inimical to,
marriage. Id. at 1267. As a consequence, until quite recently, marriage was the legally
approved site for sexual activity and, importantly, childbearing. Id. at 1268, 1270.
61. Perhaps the clearest example of this preference is the robust privacy protections afforded to
members of the marital family. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)
(expressing alarm over the prospect of police entering "the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms").
62. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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whether married or not, it noted with favor the ways in which Peter Stanley
had discharged his paternal role in the years preceding his partner's death.
Stanley was not a fly-by-night father. He shared in the parenting of his
children, living with the children and their mother for eighteen years and
sharing responsibility for their upkeep.6 3 Stanley acted like a father, but
perhaps more importantly, he acted like a husband, performing his paternal role
in a manner consistent with marital family norms.
The close association of legally cognizable fatherhood with the marital
family is even clearer in two subsequent cases involving unmarried fathers. In
Quilloin v. Walcott6" and Lehr v. Robertson,6" the Court rejected petitions for
paternal rights by two unmarried biological fathers.66 According to the Court,
what distinguished Quilloin and Lehr from Stanley was the fact that neither
father had been a consistent presence in his child's life.6" Unlike Stanley, who
had been a co-parent with his deceased partner, the two petitioning fathers had
been only minimally involved in the rearing of their children. They had not
cohabited with their children and had provided little in the way of financial or
emotional support. In short, they had failed to act in the manner of married
fathers, as Stanley had done.68 In Quilloin and Lehr, as in Stanley, the Court's
understanding of fatherhood is inextricably intertwined with its understanding
of the husband's role in the marital family.
The force of the marital family in the disposition of Quilloin and Lehr also is
visible from another perspective. In each case, the biological father raised his
63. The fact that the Court understood Peter Stanley to have functioned as a husband and father
is evident in subsequent cases where the Court contrasted the behavior of other petitioning
fathers with Peter Stanley's conduct. See infra text accompanying notes 67-68 (discussing
the Court's disposition of Quilloin and Lehr).
64. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
65. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
66. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255.
67. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267 (noting that "appellant ... ha[d] never established a substantial
relationship" with his daughter); Ouilloin, 434 U.S. at 256 (noting that appellant "ha[d]
never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision,
education, protection, or care of the child").
68. The Lehr Court underscored this critical distinction by comparing the circumstances in Lehr
to those in an earlier case, Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). See Lehr, 463 U.S. at
267. Statutes like the ones challenged in Lehr and Quilloin, the Court concluded, could "not
constitutionally be applied in that class of cases where the mother and father are in fact
similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the child." Id. The father in Caban
was deemed similarly situated to his children's mother because he, like Peter Stanley, "had
admitted paternity and had participated in the rearing of the children." Id. (discussing
Caban). As important, the father in Caban had also "contributed to the (financial] support
of the family." Caban, 441 U.S. at 383.
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claim for paternal rights to challenge an adoption petition filed by the child's
stepfather (the mother's husband).6 9 In each case, there was another father
figure, one who functioned in the family in the manner of a father and a
husband. Faced with the prospect of recognizing the rights of an itinerant
unmarried father-that is, a father who failed to comport with the paternal
norms developed in the context of the marital family -the Court chose to sever
paternal rights, allowing the child to be adopted into a marital family. In
denying Quilloin's and Lehr's claims for paternal rights and allowing the
children to be adopted by their stepfathers, the Court not only clarified the
doctrine regarding the rights of unmarried fathers, but also deemphasized "the
mere existence of a biological link" in favor of" [t] he importance of the familial
relationship[] to the individuals involved and to the society."7' These decisions
prioritize a child's opportunities for "emotional attachments that derive from
the intimacy of daily association" over the fact of biological paternity. 72 These
decisions are about providing children with the experience of being raised in
the marital family (or a family structure that closely approximated it).
The Court's preference for the marital family is still more explicit in
Michael H. v. Gerald D.73 Carole D. was married to Gerald D. when she became
pregnant by Michael H. following an extramarital affair.74 Their child, Victoria,
grew up in what the plurality opinion dismissed as a "quasi-family." 75 Victoria
regarded both Gerald and Michael as her fathers, and each man held himself
out as Victoria's father. 6 In denying Michael's claim for recognition of his
rights as Victoria's biological father, a plurality of the Court made clear its
affinity for the marital family: "The family unit accorded traditional respect in
our society" is the "'unitary family,"' a model "typified, of course, by the
marital family." 77 Though the concept of the "unitary family" could extend
beyond the marital family, it included only those family structures that most
approximated the marital family, such as the "household of unmarried parents
69. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 551.
7o. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 268 (affirming the lower court's decision to sever parental rights and
permit the stepparent adoption); Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255 ("[T]he result of the adoption in
this case is to give full recognition to a family unit already in existence ...
71. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted).
72. Id. at 261.
73. 491 U.S. 11o (1989).
74. Id. at 113-14.
7S. Id. at 114.
76. Id. at 116 (noting that Victoria also raised a due process challenge to the statute, seeking to
preserve her relationships with both Michael and Gerald).
77. Id. at 123 n.3.
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and their children" represented in Stanley.78 It did not include relationships
that "[bore] no resemblance to traditionally respected relationships," like "the
relationship established between a married woman, her lover, and their
child."79 Here, as in earlier cases, the Court links paternal rights to the embrace
of the marital family as the model legal family.
Importantly, constitutional protections for the marital family are not
confined to those cases dealing with the rights of unmarried fathers. In Troxel
v. Granville,so two grandparents sought, pursuant to a state statute, visitation
privileges with their granddaughters, the children of their deceased son.s A
state trial court complied, but on appeal, the Supreme Court struck down the
"breathtakingly broad" statute as an impermissible intrusion on parental
rights.s2 Though Troxel has been understood as pertaining solely to the
question of parental rights, it might also be understood as endorsing the
primacy of the nuclear family model over claims for alternative family
structures in which extended family might play a larger role in children's
lives.8
The claim that law favors the marital family as the normative ideal for
family life may prompt resistance. In constitutional and state law alike, several
efforts have been made to update the legal understanding of the family to
reflect the increasing diversity of family life.84 These efforts have been
manifested in constitutional protections for nonmarital children,8s rights of
78. Id. at 123.
79. Id.
80. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
81. Id. at 61. The state court concluded that visitation with their paternal grandparents would be
in the girls' best interests. The girls' mother, who had never married her daughters' father
and was now married to another man with whom she had a child, vehemently objected. Id.
82. Id. at 67.
83. As in Quilloin and Lehr, the children's mother recently had married and was creating a
marital family with her new husband, who had adopted the daughters. Id. at 61-62 (noting
Granville's marriage to Kelly Wynn and Wynn's adoption of Granville's daughters).
Extensive visitation with their grandparents likely would have precluded the girls'
integration by requiring their absence from the marital family unit their mother and her
husband were creating. Ariela R Dubler, Constructing the Modem American Family: The
Stories ofTroxel v. Granville, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 95, loo (Carol Sanger ed., 20o8).
84. Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Refraining the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and
Caregivers, 94VA. L. REV. 385, 439-41 (2008).
85. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding that laws that discriminate on the basis of
legitimacy violate the Equal Protection Clause).
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cohabitation,8 6 and nonmarital and same-sex intimacy,8s  as well as sub-
constitutional recognition of alternative legal statuses for same-sex couples88 -
legal developments that are credited with disrupting the primacy of the marital
family model. However, these seeming departures from the marital family ideal
may be less radical than they first appear. Just as unmarried fathers were
recognized as fathers when they acted like husbands, unmarried couples have
sometimes enjoyed legal protection because they acted as though they were
married.8 9
The marital model that emerges in the case law reflects several specific-
and contestable- normative preferences. Before we turn to a discussion of
familial establishment, it is worth specifying the constellation of values that
shape the legal understanding of what it is to act like a family. The marital,
nuclear family is one that encourages monogamy, procreation, industriousness,
86. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down a Cleveland housing
ordinance limiting occupancy of a single-family dwelling unit to nuclear family members).
87. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US. 558 (2003) (striking down a state law criminalizing same-sex
sodomy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down a state law prohibiting the
distribution of contraception to unmarried persons); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964) (striking down a state law prohibiting interracial cohabitation).
88. Melissa Murray, Equal Rites and Equal Rights, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1396-97 (2008)
(discussing the development of civil-union statutes); Murray, supra note 84, at 440-41, 449
(same).
89. For example, the New York Court of Appeals deemed two (unmarried) gay men "family
members" for purposes of a New York City rent and eviction regulation, in large part
because their relationship comported with traditional indicia of marital family life. Braschi
v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-55 (N.Y. 1989). Interestingly, the court declined to
find the couple to be "spouses," indicating that the terms spouse/marriage are less flexible
than the term "family." And yet, even as the court declined to find them spouses, it used the
normative concept of marriage to inform its understanding of family. Id. at 53-54 ("[A] more
realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners
whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial
commitment and interdependence. This view comports both with our society's traditional
concept of 'family' and with the expectations of individuals who live in such nuclear
units.").
Likewise, in Hann v. Housing Authority of Easton, 709 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Pa. 1989), an
unmarried couple with children was determined to be a family for purposes of public
housing assistance because they conducted their lives as though they were a marital family,
cohabiting and raising children together. Id. at 61o (noting that "[t]he only thing missing
[was] a marriage certificate"). Though not legitimated through marriage, both relationships
approximated the marital family in substance and form. See also Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely
Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, lOO COLUM. L. REV. 957, 1020 (2000)
("[C]ontemporary performance-based approaches to nonmarital cohabitation posit
marriage as the as the reigning normative model against which nonsolemnized unions are
compared and against which their legal merits are evaluated.").
1256
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insularity, and-seemingly paradoxically-a certain kind of visibility. These
last two terms warrant some explanation.
By insularity, we mean that the established family is understood as a closed
unit, a discrete group that may initially be created by the state (through a
marriage) but then functions relatively autonomously of the state. 90
Importantly, the perceived autonomy of the marital family is not first and
foremost a moral or normative autonomy, though some morally contentious
decisions are protected from state interference. 9' Rather, the norm of familial
autonomy is largely a norm of financial self-sufficiency, and the financial
independence of the family unit goes hand in hand with an expectation of
financial dependency within the family."
By visibility, we mean that the state has encouraged the view that public
recognition as a family is something to be prized. Given the association of the
family with privacy, it may seem odd to associate it also with visibility. But
familial privacy, insofar as it is protected, is a privacy of decisions and spaces. It
is not a privacy of status. 93 Instead, familial status is observed, recorded, and
90. As Martha Fineman and others have noted, this autonomy is illusory. We are all dependent
on others - and the state - at some point in our lives. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 35-40 (2004).
91. Procreative decisions are the most obvious example, but note that they are protected only up
to a point. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) ("The very
notion that the State has a substantial interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that
not all regulations [on abortion] must be deemed unwarranted."). States may restrict access
to abortion in numerous ways, and may prohibit it outright in the third trimester subject to
certain narrow exceptions. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (concluding that "the right
of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and
must be considered against important state interests in regulation"). In addition, the
cultural and political battle over the meaning of marriage should make clear that the socially
recognized "autonomy" of married couples is not a principle of moral laissez-faire.
92. See FINEMAN, supra note 90.
93. Historically, the prosecution of Mormon polygamy in the Utah Territory involved invasive
investigative techniques like questioning minors about their parentage. RICHARD S. VAN
WAGONER, MORMON POLYGAMY: A HISTORY 117-19 (2d ed. 1989). Some have argued that
Utah's modem statute criminalizing bigamy sweeps more broadly than analogous laws in
other states because of these efforts to detect and punish "unlawful cohabitation." See Brief
of Appellants at 27-32, Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d lO99 (ioth Cir. 2007) (No. 05-4161).
More recently, law enforcement efforts to prosecute underage marriages in a fundamentalist
Mormon sect in Texas included DNA testing of sect members in an attempt to determine
family relationships. James C. McKinley Jr., Trial of Sea Leader Exposes Difficulties for
Prosecutors, N.Y. TuMES, Nov. 4, 2009, at A14.
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regulated by the state. 94 Familial status is a question of legitimacy-of a
relation brought within the aegis of law. Perhaps some degree of this type of
surveillance is simply necessary as an administrative matter. What is not
obvious, though, is that individuals should place tremendous value on their
public recognition as husbands, wives, sons, and sisters. Many do, of course, as
is evident in the quest for recognition of same-sex marriage. Some dissenters
question the value of recognition, noting that recognition and regulation go
hand in hand. 9 But we think it is fair to characterize the desire for one's own
intimate relationships to be officially recognized as the predominant view
among both those who support same-sex marriage and those who oppose it.
This quest for recognition is part of the ideology of the established family.
The established family is a site of domestication, of discipline through
interdependency and visibility. From the antitotalitarian perspective, this point
bears special emphasis: the marital family is as important for what it
discourages as for what it encourages. Specifically, it discourages
nonconformity and rebelliousness by encouraging discipline through
dependency among family members. In the traditional family recognized in
early American law, men were disciplined by their obligations to support wives
and children, women were disciplined by their caregiving obligations and their
financial dependence on their husbands, and children were disciplined by their
disciplined parents. 96 This structure would provide the capitalist state with
94. Cf. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley
trans., Vintage Books 1978) (1976) (discussing the state's use of the family as a site of
intimate regulation).
95. See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS
OF QUEER LIFE 82 (1999) (arguing that the drive toward same-sex marriage will further
marginalize sexual expression and relationships that are not recognized and valued by the
state); Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, 13 DIFFERENCES: J. FEMINIST
CULTURAL STUD. 14, 17-18 (2002) (suggesting that discussions of same-sex marriage may
insufficiently value intimate relations that are neither recognized nor prohibited by the
state); Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1399, 1418 (2004) (identifying the complexity of the GLBT community's decision to
exchange one form of legal regulation of homosexuality (criminal law) for another
(marriage)); Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2685, 2687-88
(2008) (explaining that because marriage is a potent regulatory tool, the GLBT community
should be more skeptical of the drive toward same-sex marriage).
96. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) ("Man is, or
should be, woman's protector and defender .... The harmony [of] the family institution is
repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of
her husband."); Mark E. Brandon, Family at the Birth of American Constitutional Order, 77
TEx. L. REv. 1195, 1204 (1999) (discussing the Lockean view that "the family's function was
to bring the child into the exercise of reason-a kind of self-limitation-and therefore enable
him to live under law"); John Gilbert McCurdy, We the Bachelors, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2009,
119:1236 2010
DISESTABLISHING THE FAMILY
loyal and industrious citizens, at little or no cost to public coffers. Even as
American law has changed to recognize a broader array of familial
relationships, these norms of order, discipline, and intrafamilial dependence
have persisted.
Against this model, families that resist, rebel, or simply fail to conform may
be perceived as threats to the political order. Historically, the state has
responded to such threats in many ways. Of particular interest here are
responses that involve criminal sanctions. To be clear, the criminal law was a
central tool of ecclesiastical establishment, but it was not the only way in which
the state enforced religious conformity.97 Nor are criminal sanctions the only
way in which the state has established a particular model of the family. 9' But
criminal punishment is among the most coercive forms of state action, and it is
often an especially moralized state practice. 99 So if establishment entails the
state's enforcement of a particular ideology in nonstate institutions, it makes
sense to consider criminal laws that punish nonconforming ideologies - and
families' efforts to resist such laws.
B. Thick Establishment
It is no coincidence (but too rarely noted) that many of the Supreme
Court's encounters with the family involve efforts by states to use criminal
sanctions against unruly families.' We discuss several of these encounters
below, arguing that the criminal laws in question constitute efforts to establish
an official family model. Sometimes the Court has permitted and even
at A21 (observing that when the founding fathers "created a new nation, they assailed sexual
immorality, luxury and sloth-all of which they associated with the single life").
97. McConnell, supra note 35, at 2131.
98. Murray, supra note 16, at 1267 n.5o.
99. Indeed, many scholars have identified moral condemnation as the distinctive feature of
criminal (as opposed to civil) sanctions. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the
Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CoNTEM1. PROBS. 402, 404 (1958) ("What distinguishes a criminal
from a civil sanction... is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies it
and justifies its imposition.").
wo. But see Martha Minow, We, the Family: Constitutional Rights and American Families, 74 J. AM.
HIST. 959 (1987). Though Minow does not emphasize the role of criminal sanctions in early
constitutional cases involving families, she does illuminate the extent to which these cases
involved the enforcement of favored ideological positions. Id. Though Griswold v.
Connecticut and other post-196o opinions depict a lengthy tradition of respect for family
privacy, Minow suggests that this image of family autonomy is an "invented tradition." Id.
at 962. Opinions such as Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters are more accurately
characterized as the scenes of ideological battles between religious or ethnic groups. Id. at
962-65.
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enthusiastically endorsed familial establishment; on other occasions, it has
limited states' power to promote ideologies within the family. As is true of
religion, the difference between establishment and disestablishment is a
continuum rather than a stark binary dichotomy. In this section, we examine
the thick form of establishment evident in Reynolds v. United States, an 1878
case involving a criminal ban on bigamy.' ° ' Here, the link between political
ideology and family structure is closely regulated. Later cases involving
parental choices about education, discussed in the next section, depart from
this thick form of establishment, permitting some degree of autonomy within
families. Still, even in the education cases, a thin version of familial
establishment remains: autonomy from the state is a privilege of those who
adhere to the norms of the marital family, whether in form or function.
Convicted of bigamy under a federal statute in force in the Utah Territory,
George Reynolds appealed his conviction on the ground that although he had
taken a second wife in violation of the law, his religious beliefs shielded him
from criminal liability." 2 Among the "accepted doctrine[s]" of the Mormon
Church was the belief "that it was the duty of male members of [the]
church... to practise polygamy."'0 3 The United States Supreme Court upheld
the statute, finding it "impossible" to conclude that the Free Exercise Clause
precluded the criminalization of plural marriage and other "actions . . . in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order."'0 4
The religious free exercise claim is only one dimension-and a rather
cursorily dismissed one-of the Court's analysis in Reynolds. Much more
attention is given to the ideological importance of monogamous marriage and
the marital family in a democratic society: "[A]s monogamous or polygamous
marriages are allowed, do we find the principles on which the government of
the people, to a greater or lesser extent, rests.""0 s Citing the German 6migr6
Francis Lieber, the Court explained that "polygamy leads to the patriarchal
101. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
102. Id. at 146, 161. For useful studies of Reynolds in historical context, see SARAH BARRINGER
GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2002) [hereinafter GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION];
Martha M. Ertman, The Story of Reynolds v. United States: Federal "Hell Hounds" Punishing
Mormon Treason, in FAMILY LAw STORIES 51-75 (Carol Sanger ed., 2008); and Sarah
Barringer Gordon, "The Liberty of Self-Degradation": Polygamy, Woman Suffrage, and Consent
in Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica, 83 J. AM. HIST. 815 (1996) [hereinafter Gordon, The Liberty of
Self-Degradation].
103. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161 (internal quotations omitted).
104. Id. at 164-65.
105. Id. at 165-66.
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principle," and "when applied to large communities, fetters the people in
stationary despotism. "1°6 The Reynolds Court's apparent aversion to patriarchy
may pass too easily unnoted by a contemporary audience. Just six years before
Reynolds, the Supreme Court upheld a state court decision excluding women
from the practice of law, and in so doing, apparently endorsed the
subordination of women to their husbands. °7 What made polygamy's
patriarchal principle so objectionable?
In the political discourse of late nineteenth-century America, monogamous
marriage was distinguished from polygamy by the opposing concepts of
consent and coercion.io8 Monogamous marriage was marked by the parties'
consent to enter into the marital relationship. By contrast, antipolygamists
declared forcefully that Mormon women were so fettered by their religion -so
unfree-that they lacked the ability to give meaningful consent to plural
marriage.1°9 Their inability to provide meaningful consent to marriage,
coupled with their subsequent subordination to their polygamous husbands,
made polygamous wives no better than slaves. And like slaves in the
antebellum period, they too were unfit for citizenship within a democracy." 0
A distinctive view of the relation between marriage and citizenship lay
beneath the broad disapprobation of polygamy. At the time the Reynolds
decision was announced, the traditional model of monogamous marriage was
one that consigned husbands and wives to specific roles within their "separate
spheres."''. A critical component of this separate spheres ideology was the
1o6. Id. at 166. Monogamy, Lieber insisted, "is one of the primordial elements out of which all
law proceeds ... [and] the foundation of all that is called polity." Carol Weisbrod & Pamela
Sheingorn, Reynolds v. United States: Nineteenth-Century Forms of Marriage and the Status of
Women, 1O CONN. L. REv. 828, 835 (1978) (quoting Francis Lieber, The Mormons: Shall Utah
Be Admitted into the Union?, 5 PUTNAM'S MONTHLY 225, 234 (1855)).
107. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
,08. See GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION, supra note 102, at 171-72 (noting that those opposed
to polygamy emphasized the perceived absence of consent in polygamous unions).
,og. After all, what right-thinking woman would voluntarily consent to live in a "system as
fundamentally contrary to her interests as polygamy"? Id. at 173.
no. Interestingly, first wave feminists also analogized marriage to slavery. Gordon, The Liberty of
Self-Degradation, supra note 102, at 824. However, their disapprobation was not directed at
polygamous wives, but to women in monogamous marriages. Id. at 837 (observing that
marriage, like slavery, stripped wives of legal capacity and demanded their submission to
their husbands' will).
,i,. In his concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, Associate Justice Joseph Bradley famously
expounded on "the constitution of the family," which specified separate spheres for
husbands and wives. 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring); see also TOCQJUEVlLLE,
supra note 21, at 603 ( "Americans do not think that man and woman have the duty or the
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construction of the wife as the moral center of the household.1 1 2 The wife was
responsible for making the home a haven from the vulgarities and immoralities
of the public sphere, "3 all while inculcating their children with the values and
virtues necessary for citizenship.1 4
According to the antipolygamists, the role of women in polygamous
households was wholly at odds with the notion of womanhood represented by
the separate spheres and monogamous marriage. The notion of the woman as
the moral center of the household presumed not only her moral superiority,
but her possession of the virtues of good citizenship. ' Tethered to tyrannical
husbands in a "virtual harem," polygamous wives were hardly models of wifely
morality.",6 Indeed, they appeared to be willing, or at least unobjecting,
participants in the licentiousness and vice that characterized plural marriage for
most of the country. Utterly immoral and unfit for citizenship themselves,
polygamous wives, it was feared, would fail to inculcate their children with the
moral virtue and freedom-loving values necessary to sustain a vital
democracy."'
Moreover, if monogamous marriage was the foundation "[u]pon [which]
society may be said to be built," children raised in polygamy would be
dangerously ignorant of the "social relations and social obligations and duties"
associated with monogamy. Their understanding of the "family," that critical
unit of society and democracy, would be shaped by the norms and values more
right to do the same things, but they show an equal regard for the part played by both and
think of them as being of equal worth, though their fates are different.").
112. Mark E. Brandon, Home on the Range: Family and Constitutionalism in American Continental
Settlement, 52 EMORY L.J. 645, 694 (2003) ("[T]he wife, as mistress of the home, was
perceived by society and herself as the moral superior of the husband, though his legal and
social inferior.") (internal quotations and citation omitted); Barbara Welter, The Cult of
True Womanhood: 182o-186o, 18 AM. Q. 151, 151-52 (1966).
113. Welter, supra note 112, at 152.
114. Brandon, supra note 112, at 653 ("Combined with assumptions about women's innately
superior capacity for moral judgment and behavior, the educative function pictured wives
and mothers as guardians of civilization in society.").
115. For more detailed discussion of the view that mother's domestic behavior served a political
function in the cultivation of good citizens, see Linda Kerber, The Republican Mother:
Women and the Enlightenment-An American Perspective, 28 AM. Q 187, 202 (1976).
116. Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 1O5 COLUM.
L. REv. 641, 659 (2005) (quoting Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as
Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to De Shaney, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1359, 1366 & n.19
(1992)).
117. Abrams, supra note 116, at 661-62 (discussing the fears that polygamy and illiberal values
would be reproduced in subsequent generations).
ii8. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165 (1878).
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familiar to "Asiatic and ... African people.""1 9 And perhaps most troubling of
all, through the power of reproduction, polygamy would expand with each
successive generation of Mormons to the point that polygamous families could
eventually disrupt the predominance of the monogamous marital family.
Viewed through this lens, the Reynolds decision is as much (or more) a
pronouncement on family-state relationships as it is a judgment of the proper
church-state relationship. The federal ban on bigamy, like the opinion
upholding it, vindicates a particular model of the family (and its role in the
polity) over a competing-and potentially destructive- alternative.'20 At odds
with the Anglo-American legal tradition, American society, and American
norms and values,' polygamy challenged democratic governance, which was
undergirded by monogamous marriage and the marital family.1
As such, Reynolds is a case about deploying the criminal law to denounce
the polygamous family as immoral and antidemocratic while vindicating-
indeed, establishing- the marital family and its mission to cultivate future
citizens for the state. And importantly, the thick version of establishment seen
in Reynolds is uncompromising in its stance. There is conformity with law, and
there is nonconformity, which must be reordered by the force of the criminal
law. There is no middle ground where families might resist conformity, but
nevertheless be understood as serving the state.
C. Thin Establishment
Although the Reynolds Court made clear that the marital family was an
important site for the cultivation of civic virtue and "American values," the
family is certainly not the only locus for such activities. In particular, public
education has emerged as an important conduit for imparting democratic
i19. Id. at 164.
12o. The perception that polygamy-and Mormonism more generally-posed a threat to
democracy persisted, even after Reynolds. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (189o) (referring to the Mormons'
"persistent defiance of law under the government of the United States"); see also SARAH
SONG, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS OF MULTICULTURALISM 155-56 (2007)
(discussing the perception of the Mormons as an antiauthoritarian threat to the government
of the United States).
121. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165 (discussing the criminalization of polygamy in England and Wales,
and later in the United States).
122. Id. at 165-66 ("[A]ccording as monogamous or polygamous marriages are allowed, do we
find the principles on which the government of the people to a greater or less extent,
rests.").
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values and respect for national civic traditions. 12 3 This means that family and
school sometimes stand in an uneasy relationship: the ideological claims of one
institution may conflict with those of the other. In adjudicating these conflicts,
the Court has continued to underscore the importance of the family in
inculcating civic values. But it has also explicitly endorsed the family as a
source of ideological diversity. Accordingly, in the education cases, the state
tolerates nonconforming families-up to a point. Familial establishment is
thinner in this context, but it is not abandoned altogether.
In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court struck down a statute criminalizing the
teaching of any subject in any language other than English in any school, or the
teaching of languages other than English below the eighth grade." The
citizenship dimensions of the case are clear: the adoption of the statute was
animated by fears that children raised in foreign households speaking another
language as their mother tongue would develop into unreliable citizens."'2 The
familial dimensions are less immediately obvious, because the law was
challenged not by a parent, but by a schoolteacher convicted for teaching
German to his students.12'6 But in reversing the teacher's conviction, the Court
endorsed "the power of parents to control the education of their own" 27 as one
of many liberties protected by the Constitution.12
123. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.
The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative
selection.") (internal citations and quotations omitted); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (noting that public schools are "educating the young for
citizenship").
124. 262 U.S. 390, 397, 400 (1923).
125. The statute, popularly known as the "Foreign Language Statute," was enacted after World
War I amid a wave of anti-German hysteria. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of
Initiatives and Referendums in Which Majorities Vote on Minorities' Democratic Citizenship, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 450 n.239 (1999). The statute was part of the "loo percent Americanism"
campaign, a nationwide pro-American movement that identified and celebrated the "beliefs
and actions of patriotic Americans." Mark Kessler, Legal Discourse and Political Intolerance:
The Ideology of Clear and Present Danger, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 559, 574 (1993).
126. Robert Meyer, a teacher at the Lutheran Zion Parochial School in Hamilton County,
Nebraska was charged with violating the Foreign Language Statute. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-
97.
127. Id. at 401. The Court also referred to Meyer's own rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
("the calling of modem language teachers"), id., but most of its discussion focuses on
parental autonomy and the limits of state power to direct children's education. Id. at 400-03.
128. The Court read the Fourteenth Amendment to protect "the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
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Those who supported the ban on foreign language teaching saw immigrant
families as a political threat, much as antipolygamists saw Mormon families as
a political threat. But the Supreme Court's evaluations of the perceived danger
to the state differ sharply. Meaningfully, the German-American families
discussed in Meyer were not raising their children in the polygamous
arrangements seen in Reynolds. True, these families imparted to their children
the customs and traditions of their native land, much to the consternation of
those Nebraskans who preferred a greater degree of assimilation. But, as the
Court noted, the immigrant families were not sufficiently threatening to
democracy to require the state to usurp the parents' role in raising their
children. 29 Indeed, the Court suggested that the linguistic and cultural
diversity of immigrant families could actually be "helpful and desirable" in a
democratic society. 3°
Meyer may be read to adopt the kind of antitotalitarian argument for
institutional and ideological diversity explored in Part I. Recalling Plato's
suggestion to raise children in common and the Spartans' history of communal
education designed to "submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens," the
Court maintained that laws intended to "foster a homogenous people," though
well-intended, may go too far in their desire to cultivate good citizens.'
3
'
Homogeneity of the sort advocated by Plato and sought by the Nebraska
legislature was "coerc[ive]" and yielded citizens who could neither discern nor
challenge tyranny in their midst.'32 Such homogeneity was more in keeping
with totalitarianism than with democracy.
133
The Court later elaborated this point in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.'34 Under
Oregon's Compulsory Education Act, parents who failed to enroll their
children in public schools were subject to criminal sanctions. 3 Here, the
to marry, establish a home and bring up children ...." Id. at 399. Some of these liberties
have since been denied full constitutional protection. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Lochner v. New York and the concept of an unfettered freedom of
contract). But the principle of familial autonomy, for the most part, survives.
129. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403 ("No emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a child of
some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the
consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed.").
130. Id. at 400.
131. Id. at 401-02.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 402 (noting that the state's insistence on homogeneity "exceed[ed] the limitations"
of the state's power and "conflict[ed] with rights assured to [citizens]").
134. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
135. Id. at 530-31, at *.
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perceived threat was Catholicism (and again, immigration).' 36 Citing Meyer
approvingly, the Pierce Court struck down the statute, deeming fundamental
"the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control." 37 As in Meyer, the Court referenced the coercion
inherent in crafting a homogenous citizenry and the democratic potential of the
family as a check on such governmental excesses. "The child," the Court
declared, "is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.1 38
Interestingly, these protections for parental rights operate in terms similar
to the First Amendment's protections for religion. The fundamental right of
parents to raise their children in the manner of their choosing enunciated in
Pierce and Meyer is akin to a right to familial free exercise; it provides families
with space to be nonconforming. But what of the complementary protection-
a principle of familial nonestablishment? If Pierce and Meyer offer families a
space where they need not conform, do they also abandon the idea of familial
establishment seen in Reynolds?
Though Pierce and Meyer recognize some parental prerogatives, the Court
does not necessarily abdicate the state's interest in establishing a particular
form of family. Certainly, the Court's pronouncements in Meyer and Pierce
make clear that the family, as a font of pluralistic traditions and customs that
foster a heterogeneous polity, is essential to democratic government-a
bulwark against the state's own totalitarian impulses. But it does not
necessarily follow that all nonconforming families will be welcomed and
accepted as democracy enhancing.
The specter of nonconforming polygamous family denounced in Reynolds is
present but unmentioned in Pierce and Meyer. Some degree of linguistic,
cultural, or educational pluralism can enhance democracy by challenging state
impulses toward homogeneity. But familial pluralism -deviations from the
form and substantive values of the marital family-is less amenable to
136. See Josh Chafetz, Social Reproduction and Religious Reproduction: A Democratic-
Communitarian Analysis of the Yoder Problem, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 263, 276 (2006).
As in Meyer, the actual plaintiffs in Pierce were not convicted parents, but a Catholic
organization that maintained several parochial schools, and a private all-male military
training school. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531-33. But the challenged statute was directed at parents:
it required parents, guardians, and other persons having custody of children to enroll them
in the local public school. Id. at 530-31.
137. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
138. Id. at 535.
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democratic life.139 As the Reynolds Court suggests, such departures breed chaos,
tyranny, and despotism- everything that is inimical to (and threatening to)
democracy. 4 o
In this way, Pierce and Meyer offer a more nuanced conception of familial
establishment than that seen in Reynolds. Reynolds's thick notion of
establishment draws a line in the sand. There is an acceptable family and a
clearly unacceptable family, and nothing in between. 14' By contrast, the Court's
decisions in Pierce and Meyer admit the possibility of acceptance for
nonconforming families-up to a point. As Pierce and Meyer make clear,
parents have broad authority to raise their children, 142 particularly when they
do so within the structure and normative parameters of the marital family. 143
To see that rights of familial free exercise are conditioned on conformity
with the established family norm, consider a case that explicitly combines the
free exercise issues of Reynolds with the education concerns of Pierce and Meyer:
139. It is also worth considering the social contexts that distinguish Pierce and Meyer from
Reynolds. Even those schools that provided foreign language instruction or religious
instruction also provided instruction in elements specifically designed to foster patriotism. A
child raised in a polygamous family in the Utah Territory had few options for acquiring the
American values perceived as inherent in the monogamous family. Moreover, the particular
political circumstances in Utah guaranteed that almost all available institutions would
accept-if not promote -polygamy as the accepted model for family life. To that point,
adherence to polygamy would clearly convey one's allegiances to the Mormon Church and
its institutions, rather than the nation itself. See Ertman, supra note 102, at 163-70 (arguing
that the nineteenth century anxiety over Mormon polygamy was rooted in fears that
Mormons were political traitors faithful to their church and territorial government, rather
than to the United States).
140. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
141. To be clear, neither Pierce nor Meyer discusses family form explicitly -both cases are focused
on the exercise of parental autonomy in the context of educational choices. Nevertheless, the
facts of both cases make clear that the families at issue were organized along the traditional
lines of the nuclear family. While they departed from preferred norms regarding education,
they did not deviate from the form of the established family, and thus were less threatening
to the state's authority.
142. Of course, parental authority is not unfettered. "The state may intervene into the family to
usurp parental decisionmaking authority only in limited circumstances, such as abuse,
neglect, and abandonment." Murray, supra note 84, at 395-96.
143. Scholars such as Dorothy Roberts and Linda Gordon have discussed at length the degree to
which nonconformity with the marital family norm invites state scrutiny and interference.
See Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105 YALE L.J. 1563, 1577
(1996) (book review) (criticizing government interference with the morality of single
mothers who are welfare recipients). See generally LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT
ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 (1994) (discussing
the history of state regulation of single mothers).
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Wisconsin v. Yoder.'" In Yoder, three Amish fathers challenged a law mandating
high school attendance on the ground that it impermissibly conflicted with the
sect's religious values and practices. 4 '
Given the parents' explicit free exercise claim, Yoder looks a lot like
Reynolds. In both cases, religious minorities were convicted under criminal laws
requiring them to forego essential tenets of their faiths in order to conform to
the state's particular ideological commitments. But importantly, the facts of
Yoder and Reynolds are not solely about limitations on religious exercise; they
also are about state-imposed limitations on the exercise of particular family
commitments. At bottom, both cases involved laws that challenged the rights
of families to live their family lives in the manner of their choosing.
Despite these similarities, the Yoder Court barely mentions Reynolds,146 and
importantly, its disposition of the case departs significantly from the logic of
Reynolds and its thick account of familial establishment. The Reynolds Court
upheld the territorial law criminalizing bigamy on the ground that the First
Amendment protects religious beliefs but not necessarily religious practices.147
In contrast, in Yoder, the Court protects some kinds of religious practices- like
foregoing high school-as essential expressions of religious beliefs.4 8 In so
doing, the Court explicitly embraced the reasoning of Pierce and Meyer and
their "thinner" accounts of familial establishment. What explains the
difference?
Although their religious traditions marked them as distinctive in modern
America, the form and substance of Amish family life was nonetheless
consistent with the essential attributes of the marital family and the project of
144. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
145. Id. at 210-11.
146. Reynolds is cited twice by the majority for the proposition that "activities of individuals, even
when religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the States," particularly where
"[t]he conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to
public safety, peace or order." Id. at 220, 230 (internal citations omitted). In a vigorous
dissent, however, Justice Douglas argues that the majority's opinion allows "organized
religion a broader base than it has ever enjoyed," perhaps portending that "in time Reynolds
will be overruled." Id. at 247 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
147. Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) ("Laws are made for the government of actions, and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.").
148. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220 ("But to agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be
subject to the broad police power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of
the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability.").
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cultivating good citizens for the state.149 As individual families, and as a
community, they were "productive and very law-abiding" and, importantly,
self-sustaining and financially independent."' 0 Tellingly, the Court explicitly
noted that none of members of the Anish community "had ... been known to
commit crimes, that none had been known to receive public assistance, and
that none were unemployed."'"' Unlike the polygamous families denounced in
Reynolds as despotic and un-American, Amish families reflected the essential
attributes of the marital family established in the American legal tradition,
while also offering the safe, tolerable pluralism recognized in Meyer and Pierce.
Without attention to familial form, it is not easy to reconcile Reynolds and
Yoder. Indeed, the polygamous families in Reynolds satisfied the standards of
industriousness and financial independence praised in Yoder. But the Court
viewed the isolation of the Amish as an "idiosyncratic separateness" exemplary
of "the diversity we profess to admire and encourage." ' 2 The Mormon
polygamists, in contrast, were threatening in their isolationism and
self-declared "sovereignty.""'
Of course, the cases arose in distinct historical and jurisprudential contexts
and were separated by almost a century."5 But there is also something more
basic at work-at least in part. The pluralism embodied in Mormon family life
was not the sort of democracy-enhancing diversity celebrated in Meyer, Prince,
and later, Yoder. Accordingly, Mormon family life would not serve as a bulwark
against the homogeneity of a tyrannical state; instead, it was interpreted as an
attempt to establish a tyrannical theocracy existing within the country's
149. Generally, Amish families are composed of a husband and wife living with their children
(and perhaps an elderly family member). See JOHN A. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY 145-67
(4th ed. 1993) (discussing Amish family life); Franklin G. Snyder, Nomos, Narrative, and
Adjudication: Toward ajurisgenetic Theory of Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1623, 1689 (1999)
(noting that, in terms of "[t]heir nuclear family life, their houses and food, their general
cosmology, and their theology," the Amish "share many more narratives of the rest of
America than one might suspect").
150. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222.
151. Id. at 223 n.ll.
152. Id. at 226.
153. See generally GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION, supra note 102 (noting that the Mormon
conflict was essentially a battle in which the supremacy of the federal government over a
rogue territory was at stake).
154. The political dynamics of the postbellum United States, coupled with its particular
understanding of polygamy, all shaped the conditions in which the Court decided Reynolds
in 1878. When the Court decided Yoder nearly a century later, there had developed a
substantial body of jurisprudence concerning First Amendment rights and the fundamental
rights of parents that had not informed Reynolds's disposition.
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borders."' 5 The Mormons' deviation from the marital family betrayed their
deviation from the substance of democratic principles.
The Amish families in Yoder, by contrast, presented a vision of family life
rooted in democratic principles even as they lived apart from modern society.
As the Court observed, the Amish lived "a life in harmony with nature and the
soil." s6 Theirs was a family life consistent with "the simple life of the early
Christian era" and the families that shaped and cultivated American democracy
"during much of our early national life."" 7 Accordingly, their deviations from
the norms and standards of modern America- their dress, their insularity, and
their antipathy toward high school -could be accepted as pluralistic traditions
that fostered and nurtured democracy."8
IlI.THE FAMILY-STATE RELATIONSHIP, REIMAGINED
Disestablishing the family: our use of the present participle is deliberate.
Many forms of familial establishment have already been dismantled: legitimacy
classifications, adultery prohibitions, and sodomy bans are just a few
examples.5 9 The law of marriage is in flux, but there is little doubt that the
trend in recent years is toward a thinner form of establishment, if not
disestablishment 6 ° Whether legal developments continue on this path
155. See Gordon, The Liberty of Self-Degradation, supra note 102.
156. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210.
157. Id.
158. Austin Sarat & Roger Berkowitz, Disorderly Differences: Recognition, Accommodation, and
American Law, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 285, 298 (1994) (discussing the Yoder Court's
sentimental depiction of the Amish "as exemplars of fundamental American values"). It is
perhaps not coincidental that Yoder was decided only four years before the American
Bicentennial celebrations.
159. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding unconstitutional a criminal ban on
same-sex sodomy); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (holding unconstitutional
discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy). Although laws criminalizing adultery continue
on the books in a number of states, actual prosecutions are quite rare. See Elizabeth F.
Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REv.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 277, 290 n.5o (2004) (collecting adultery statutes). The impact of the
Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence renders the likelihood of adultery prosecutions even
more remote. See 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that Lawrence "called
into question" the continued vitality of adultery prohibitions and other morals legislation);
Hobbs v. Smith, No. 0 5CVS267, 20o6 WL 3103008 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 20o6)
(striking down a law criminalizing fornication and adultery on the ground that it violated
substantive due process rights).
16o. See, e.g., NANcY F. CoTr, PuBuc Vows: A HIsTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 212
(2000) (characterizing the changed "relation between marriage and the state" as
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remains to be seen. Also uncertain are the political benefits of
disestablishment.161 As we have emphasized, disestablishment offers no
guarantees. Indeed, it poses risks- it may shield illiberal families and produce
illiberal citizens. The antitotalitarian approach thus raises an enduring question
about the extent to which a liberal government should tolerate illiberal
practices and institutions. We have not sought to resolve that debate here, but
we have suggested reasons to think that a liberal government might need to
endure certain risks in order to survive as liberal.
Indeed, we think disestablishment, with all its perils, holds more promise
than the statist alternative. That alternative is endorsed (though not by that
name) in an important recent book on family-state relationships in the criminal
law. Privilege or Punish: Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties lists and
critiques many instances in which criminal sanctions (or indirect burdens of
the criminal justice system) are distributed with reference to familial
relationships.162 Dan Markel, Jennifer Collins, and Ethan Leib identify an array
of family-based benefits (including testimonial privileges, sentence reductions,
exemptions from liability for harboring fugitives) and an array of family-based
burdens (including some discussed here, such as bigamy and nonpayment of
child support) as violations of liberal and egalitarian norms. Privilege or Punish
sometimes seems to endorse principles of familial autonomy, and its authors
profess a commitment to a "liberal minimalist paradigm. ',, 63 But the book's
argument is, in fact, deeply statist, and it offers proponents of limited
government little but alarm.
"disestablishment"); Tamara Metz, The Liberal Case for Disestablishing Marriage, 6
CONTEMP. POL. THEOR'Y 196, 199 (2007) ("[B]y some accounts the establishment of
marriage is weakening."). We would balk at calling these changes "disestablishment."
Although the marital nuclear family is no longer the only acceptable model for family life,
nonconforming families and family practices are often judged against the model of the
marital nuclear family, further entrenching its primacy as the normative ideal for intimate
life. As such, we would not characterize this trend as complete disestablishment.
161. We do not here propose a particular model of familial disestablishment or identify the types
of families that might be recognized under such an approach. Suffice to say that the
boundaries that define the legal family are fraught with dignitary and economic interests.
Instead, the Feature intends only to identify the degree to which the existing model of the
established family is inadequate and to gesture toward an approach that might yield more
satisfying models.
16a. MARKEL, COLLINS & LEIB, supra note 18.
163. Id. at 95-96. Markel, Collins, and Leib imply a strong commitment to family autonomy in
several instances. See, e.g., id. at xiii ("It is one thing for the law to recognize how citizens
organize themselves into close circles of affection; but it is another for the criminal law to
take a stance on how citizens ought to organize themselves-and to discredit and
disadvantage those who choose to draw their circles of intimacy differently.").
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The authors note that the modern liberal state has an "ambivalent"
relationship to the family; this ambivalence stems from the fact that families do
not always serve state interests, 64 Of course, families routinely serve the state's
interests by providing "care services" that the state cannot afford to provide on
its own.' 61 But in the criminal justice system, Privilege or Punish argues, most
legal protections for families impede the state's efforts to deter and prosecute
crime. 66 For purposes of this Feature, we leave aside the merits of that claim.
We emphasize instead the vantage point from which the authors make it: the
question, as far as they are concerned, is whether or not families serve the
interests of the state. The relevant perspective is that of the state itself.'6 7 But as
individuals, why should we assume the state and ask how best to serve its
interests? To the authors of Privilege or Punish, to prioritize family before state
is, at best, a sign of human frailty. 68
For those who reject the statist perspective, however, it is not clear why this
prioritization, or other demands for limited government, should be understood
164. Id. at 23-25.
165. "By giving families special support... the state may be able to economize on expenditures
that it would otherwise be forced to bear in educating its citizenry and preparing its
members to contribute to the stability and flourishing of the regime." Id. at 24.
166. See id. at 25.
167. So, for example, Markel, Collins, and Leib would permit classifications based on family
status when they serve as "proxies for promoting some of the distinctive purposes of the
criminal justice system." Id. at xix. The "normative framework" the authors adopt is one
that simply asserts the priority of the state. See, e.g., id. at 29 ("[W]e do not think the
interest ... in ... encouraging close familial relationships ... constitutes sufficient reason
for the state to deny our commitment to the truth-seeking function of the criminal justice
system."); id. at 58 ("[Tlhe state's and the public's interests should generally prevail over
the need to promote the comparatively private interest of family preservation and
'harmony.'"); see also infra note 187 (discussing the statist perspective evinced by Markel,
Collins, and Leib).
168. MARKEL, COLLINS & LEIB, supra note 18, at 29 ("Although it cannot be denied that humans
are frail and fallible - particularly when it comes to family loyalty- the state simply cannot
legitimize its acceptance of perjury and obstruction by refusing to prosecute individuals who
engage in these practices."); id. at 43 (characterizing laws that exempt family members from
prosecution for harboring a fugitive as "an acknowledgment of human frailty," and arguing
that the exemptions are misguided) (quoting State v. Mobbley, 65o P.2d 841, 843 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1982) (Lopez, J., dissenting)). It is worth noting that in other cultures, the
presumption of institutional superiority is quite different. Prior to the Cultural Revolution,
Chinese culture placed allegiance to the family ahead of allegiance to the state. DERK BODDE
& CLARENCE MORIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA: EXEMPLIFIED BY 190 CH'ING DYNASTY CASES
39 (1967) (noting that although Confucianism placed "heavy emphasis" on both loyalty to
family and the state, if the two conflicted, loyalty to family was prioritized).
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as weakness.16 9 As we have argued here, an antitotalitarian argument for
religious liberty recognizes that religious belief may lead to demands for
limited government and may even undermine political power-and the
antitotalitarian finds religion to be valuable for just that reason. Similarly, the
fact that familial obligations may compete with political ones is a reason to
value families, not a reason to bemoan them. Of course, families and churches,
like states, may exercise coercion. We do not suggest that familial obligations
should always and inevitably trump political authority. Instead, those truly
committed to liberal minimalism might attempt to stand at a critical distance
from both family and state and ask what institutional relationships would best
preserve individual freedom.
The principle of institutional pluralism explored in Part I might be
contrasted with two other visions, each of which appears at times in Privilege or
Punish. First, one might maintain the state's institutional primacy, but be more
permissive with respect to the structure of the subsidiary institutions that the
state recognizes and regulates. Call this the contract model: individuals have
greater ability to structure their family lives, but the state enforces the chosen
structures (and, of course, choose which ones to enforce). Or one might, again,
maintain the state's institutional primacy, and ask it to be indifferent to the
subsidiary institution of the family. Call this the family-blindness model.
The contract model would encourage individuals to formalize intimate
relationships of various forms in private contracts. 170 The state would enforce
169. Recall, again, Antigone and her sister Ismene:
ISMENE: 0 think, Antigone; we are women; it is not for us
To fight against men; our rulers are stronger than we,
And we must obey in this, or in worse than this.
May the dead forgive me, I can do no other
But hs I am commanded ....
ANTIGONE: Go your own way; I will bury my brother;
And if I die for it, what happiness!
SOPHOCLES, supra note 5, at 128. Which of these sisters is best described as frail?
Privilege or Punish refers to Antigone briefly, but the authors find the analogy between
her story and their own concerns about conflicting obligations "imperfect." See MARKEL,
COLLINS & LEIB, supra note i8, at xii, 156 nn.16-17. "[W]e are more sympathetic to
Antigone's plight because the edict she was flouting was unreasonable and oppressive ....
Antigone's defiance of Creon may be viewed as a rebellion against an unjust law. .. ." Id. at
156-57 n.17. But to excuse Antigone because she was bound by an unjust law is to miss the
point. How does an individual gain the capacity to decide whether a law is just or unjust? Or
the willpower to defy an unjust law? These faculties, we argue, are unlikely to arise in
persons for whom the state is the only authoritative institution.
170. Mary Lyndon Shanley, Just Marriage: On the Public Importance of Private Unions, in JUST
MARRIAGE 3 (Mary Lyndon Shanley ed., 2004).
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the contracts, but it would not limit the capacity to contract to heterosexual
couples, and the individual parties would have broad discretion to determine
the content of the contract.' Obviously, contracts are already frequently used
to structure familial relationships and obligations, often in the context of civil
matters. 71 In Privilege or Punish, however, Markel, Collins, and Leib argue that
contracts should sometimes serve as the basis for criminal regulation of
families.'73 In addition to punishing failures to rescue (or protect) on the basis
of traditionally recognized familial relationships, the state should invite
individuals to make and record "covenants of care."'74 Once persons have
voluntarily assumed responsibility to care for designated dependents, any
failure to provide appropriate care should subject the registrant to criminal
liability.
It is difficult to imagine why anyone would invite the criminal regulation of
his or her intimate associations in this way. Given our antitotalitarian concerns,
we note only that whatever one makes of this proposal, it cannot be fairly
characterized as liberal minimalism.7 s Instead, it is authoritarianism with a
voluntarist face. It justifies state regulation of intimate relationships on the
ground that the state has been invited in. Here again, it is helpful to think of
the Establishment Clause. On the antitotalitarian view, we do not satisfy the
171. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing
Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1165 (2006). Of course, as Zelinsky and other
contract proponents note, many individuals may enter intimate associations but fail to
formalize the relationship in a contract. Zelinsky argues that states should adopt default
rules to apply to such persons. Id. at 1183.
172. See Edwardson v. Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 199o) (enforcing a prenuptial contract
negotiating around default rules for post-dissolution property distribution). But see Borelli
v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to enforce a postnuptial
agreement requiring the husband to compensate the wife for providing care to him).
173. MARKEL, COUINS & LEiB, supra note 18, at 90-93.
174. Id. at 91. Markel, Collins, and Leib argue that "one's familial status qua spouse or parent
may be presumptively used to establish that the relationship involves voluntarism," and so
the criminal law could continue to punish those who neglect their spouses or children
whether or not they register for covenants of care. Id.
175. Oddly, after arguing for covenants of care, the authors consider and reject similar covenants
of loyalty.
[We toyed with an idea.., that parties should be able to opt into a regime of
voluntary criminal law regulation, such that breach of a contract for monogamy
could lead to criminal prosecutions for bigamy or adultery. But upon further
consideration, we recognized the unfairness of using public resources to
investigate, prosecute, and punish conduct that amounted to a breach of private
promises between individuals.
Id. at 139.
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Establishment Clause by securing the consent of a church to be regulated,
funded, or otherwise supervised by the state. The rationale for separate
institutions is nonwaivable. Of course, we do not suggest that the state is never
permitted to punish violence or abuse within families (or within churches). But
the rationale for such punishment is based on the individual victim's interest in
avoiding abuse. The state's intervention is not dependent on whether the
abuser has invited the state in.176
There are two additional reasons to be wary of contract models for intimate
relations. First, the contract paradigm may invite the rhetoric or norms of
economic privatization. This is not an inevitable consequence; as we have
discussed, economic self-sufficiency is a central component of the ideal marital,
nuclear family, and in theory any move away from that model could diminish
expectations of economic insularity. But given the association of private
contract with private economic relationships, to view families as contracts may
further entrench norms of financial insularity. Though we cannot develop the
argument at length here, we believe a disestablishment perspective is consistent
with substantial public financial support for caregiving within families.'"
Second, the contract paradigm is conceptually inaccurate in many respects.
Familial associations (like religious ones) are not always strictly voluntary, and
the law should not pretend otherwise. Adult intimate relationships most
approach the voluntarist model, though even here voluntariness is often
overstated. The parent-child relationship often (but not always) begins with
the parent's choice, but it never begins with the child's. In almost all cases,
relationships with siblings or extended relatives are not entered voluntarily. 178
176. The registry proposal seems to perpetuate the view that the wrongdoers' consent is the
source of the right to punish. For a critique of that understanding of punishment, see Alice
Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CAL. L. REv. 6Ol (2009).
1T7. Education disestablishment, according to Michael McConnell, entails "the idea ... that
families would be permitted to choose among a range of educational options, including but
not limited to government schools, using their fair share of educational funding to pay for
the schooling they choose." McConnell, supra note 51, at 87. On this view, access to diverse
educational experiences should not be the privilege of wealthy families who can
independently pay for private schools. So long as public funding is not used to promote a
particular religion or to facilitate state control of religious institutions, publicly funded
voucher programs do not violate the Establishment Clause. In short, antitotalitarian
principles of disestablishment do not prohibit, and may even require, public funding for
families who wish to educate their children at religious schools. It is possible to extend these
arguments to defend other kinds of public funding to families. In particular, voucher
programs might be developed that would enable families to pursue a greater range of
childcare options -beyond the traditional marital family with one stay-at-home parent.
178. Theoretically individuals, once grown, can exit family relationships that they did not choose,
but this does not make the voluntary label accurate. Notably, Antigone's particular loyalty to
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To treat familial obligations as voluntarist is to misrepresent the character of
those obligations in important ways. Michael Sandel has made a similar
argument with respect to religious obligations. To speak of the right of free
exercise as "freedom of choice" is misleading; "freedom of conscience" is a
better term.' 79 Religious beliefs often are not a matter of choice -and according
to Sandel, following Madison and Jefferson, that is why they should be
protected: "It is precisely because belief is not governed by the will that
freedom of conscience is inalienable. '" 8° Similarly, as discussed below, the
not-fully-voluntary nature of familial relationships may provide an argument
for legal exemptions based on family status in certain circumstances.
Another model for the family-state relationship is a principle of family
blindness. As some have argued that laws should be color blind or gender
blind, so one could argue that they should be family blind. A rule of absolute
family blindness would be difficult to implement, but it is possible to imagine
official indifference to family status as a normative goal. At times, Markel,
Collins, and Leib seem to advocate this approach. 8' We do not advocate a
family-blind law. First, family blindness, like color blindness, may simply
entrench existing discriminatory practices and impede efforts to eliminate
those practices. 82 Second, to the extent that individuals actively seek public
recognition of their familial associations, we would not ask the state to deny
that recognition, so long as it is not granted selectively to promote a particular
model of the family. Third, an antitotalitarian approach may sometimes need
to recognize families in order to accommodate them, as is true of religious
institutions and religious duties.
Disestablishment may help inspire models of family-state relationships
preferable to those motivated by principles of contract or family blindness. Of
course, disestablishment itself may be susceptible to multiple interpretations,
Polyneices is based on the fact that her relationship with him was not chosen and, in fact,
was beyond her control. She would not have made the same choice to bury a husband or
child, given that marriage and motherhood involve somewhat more individual agency: "0
but I would not have done the forbidden thing / For any husband or for any son ....
I could have had another husband / And by him other sons, if one were lost.
SOPHOCLES, supra note 5, at 150.
179. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY 65-71 (1996).
18o. Id. at 66.
i8l. They distinguish their argument from an equal protection claim that familial classifications
should get strict scrutiny, but urge that "as a policy matter, the government should view the
use of family status skeptically." MARKEL, COLLINS & LEIB, supra note 18, at xvii.
18a. Ian F. Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness,
59 STAN. L. REv. 985 (2007) (critiquing color blindness).
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as it has been in the context of religion.81 But if we focus on the antitotalitarian
argument for religious disestablishment, we find two church-state issues of
particular interest to a disestablished family-state relationship. From the
antitotalitarian perspective, there are often good reasons to recognize religious
accommodations from generally applicable laws, and there may be good
reasons to make public funding available to religious institutions that fulfill
important secular functions.,1 4  Similarly, a principle of familial
disestablishment provides a rationale for family status accommodations from
the burdens of criminal law. And it offers an argument for increased public
funding for important caregiving services that take place within families.
Exemptions and accommodations address the question that arose in
Reynolds and Yoder: when an ostensibly neutral and generally applicable law
interferes with religious practice, should the believer be excused from
compliance? In the religion context, most commentators seem to agree that
such exemptions are often desirable, though there are continuing disputes
about whether exemptions should be determined solely by legislatures (in
which case they are more frequendy called accommodations) or, in some cases,
mandated by the judiciary.' Without entering that debate, we note that
antitotalitarian principles support a parallel practice of familial
accommodation. If we recognize families as independent sources of value and
meaning, then we may want to protect them from certain laws that burden
their normative independence.
In particular, the "family ties benefits" in the criminal justice system of
which Markel, Collins, and Leib complain-such as spousal testimonial
privileges, sentencing discounts, and exemptions from fugitive harboring
183. When it comes to religion, there is as much-or more- disagreement about how to
implement the Establishment Clause as there is about the rationale for disestablishment.
Even those who agree on the purpose of disestablishment often disagree about how best to
resolve particular church-state controversies.
184. These two issues -exemptions from generally applicable laws and funding to religious
institutions - are two of the most controversial and widely discussed questions arising under
the religion clauses today. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the
Establishment Clause, So WM. & MARYu L. REV. 1831, 1927-28 (2009) (identifying these two
issues and a third: whether democratically enacted laws may permissibly be based on
religious beliefs).
185. See id. at 1929; cf. Abner S. Greene, The Irreducible Constitution, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
293, 307 (1996) (distinguishing judicially mandated exemptions from legislatively crafted
accommodations). Since we do not take a position on whether familial accommodations
should be decided by the legislature or judiciary, we use the terms accommodation and
exemption interchangeably below.
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laws 8 6 - could be understood and defended as accommodations of familial
obligations .17 Laws mandating testimony do not themselves address or defend
any particular model of the family, but when applied to require one spouse to
testify against another, such laws threaten the institutional independence of the
family. A society that prized such independence might well choose to grant
exemptions in these circumstances, although it might have to grant testimonial
privileges more broadly than does present law, in order to avoid preferential
treatment for certain family forms. A similar analysis applies to exemptions
from fugitive harboring laws and to sentencing discounts. From an
antitotalitarian perspective, it is no answer to assert, as Markel, Collins, and
Leib do, that exemptions will impede the state's exercise of its criminal
enforcement authority. Part of the value of families is that they ensure that the
state is not the only authority in the game.
CONCLUSION
In offering these preliminary reflections on the consequences of familial
disestablishment, we do not pretend that total disestablishment is possible, nor
do we pretend to resolve all the many practical issues that disestablishment
entails. 8 There is much more thinking to be done. But we hope to have
illustrated the normative appeal of an antitotalitarian approach.
186. MARKEL, COLLINS & LEIB, supra note 18, at 36-43 (describing and critiquing evidentiary
privileges); id. at 43-45 (describing and critiquing exemptions for family members from laws
that punish harboring a fugitive); id. at 46-53 (describing and critiquing pretrial release and
sentencing decisions that take into account a defendant's familial relationships and
obligations).
187. It is worth noting that the labeling of these exemptions as "benefits" evinces the statist
perspective of Privilege or Punish. If the only visible obligations are those to the state, then a
release from those obligations is easily characterized as a benefit. But if we do not take the
state as the most important human institution, then it is easier to recognize other sources of
obligation. A defendant released early from prison to care for a family member has not
simply received a free pass; he has been released from one obligation to assume another.
Markel, Collins, and Leib would sometimes take family relationships into account in
sentencing or prison furlough or visitation policies, but in this context, their statist
presumption is again evident: "[O]ne of the strong arguments for having the state benefit
the family arises when the family is doing work the state very much wants done." Id. at 53.
See also Murray, supra note 84, at 427-32 (discussing the state's considerations vis-a-vis the
family in sentencing departures).
188. In some instances, the state cannot avoid making crucial decisions about the composition of
families. For example, as James Dwyer has recently explained, the state must set default
rules for the custody of newborn infants. James G. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The
State, Parentage, and the Rights of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. REv. 755 (2009).
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And, once more, we want to acknowledge the risks inherent in embracing
institutions that compete with the state or enjoy protection from its reach.
Although the antitotalitarian principle clearly recognizes families as valuable
institutions, no one should get too misty-eyed. Families-like churches, and
like states themselves-are potential sources of numerous tangible and
intangible goods, including care, support, emotional and intellectual
engagement, education, moral guidance, and a sense of belonging. But
families-again like churches, and again like states-are also potential sources
of violence, abuse, brainwashing, discrimination, or neglect. If free from state
regulation, families may inflict harm on the individuals within them, and they
may inculcate illiberal values or produce illiberal citizens.
Some of these risks are easier to address than others. We do not think
familial disestablishment disallows state intervention in response to familial
violence, anymore than religious disestablishment disallows efforts to combat
abuse within religious institutions. But the danger that disestablishment may
permit or even encourage the development of illiberal values is a real one. We
are not sure, however, that it is a danger that a liberal state can forestall if it is
to remain liberal. Justice Jackson, who famously warned against "doctrinaire
logic" that would render the Constitution a suicide pact, elsewhere
acknowledged the other side of the coin: "[F]reedom to differ is not limited to
things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom.
The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of
the existing order."' 8 9
The antitotalitarian perspective explored here implies that a liberal order
must sometimes leave its heart exposed. Liberal democracy is risky. So is
freedom. We are concerned with possibilities for individual freedom,
recognizing that individuals live and grow in the context of various social and
political institutions. The question to ask of families, and of other institutions,
is whether and how they serve the persons who live in and among them.
i89. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); see also Terminiello v. City
of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("There is danger that, if the Court
does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the
constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.").
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